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ABSTRACT 
A platoon commander has a helicopter to support two squads, which encounter 
two types of missions—critical or routine—on a daily basis.  During a mission, a squad 
always benefits from having the helicopter, but the benefit is greater during a critical 
mission than during a routine mission.  Because the commander cannot verify the mission 
type beforehand, a selfish squad would always claim a critical mission to compete for the 
helicopter—which leaves the commander no choice but to assign the helicopter at 
random. 
In order to encourage truthful reports from the squads, we design a token system 
that works as follows.  Each squad keeps a token bank, with tokens deposited at a certain 
frequency.  A squad must spend either 1 or 2 tokens to request the helicopter, while the 
commander assigns the helicopter to the squad who spends more tokens, or breaks a tie at 
random.  The two selfish squads become players in a two-person non-zero-sum game. 
We find the Nash Equilibrium of this game, and use numerical examples to illustrate the 







































The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis addresses the problem of a platoon commander in charge of two 
squads which encounter two types of missions, critical or routine.  The squads may 
request support in the form of the platoon’s sole helicopter.  The commander does not 
know each squad’s current mission type and must assign the helicopter based on each 
squad’s report.  During a mission, a squad always benefits from having the helicopter, but 
the benefit provided by the helicopter is greater during a critical mission than during a 
routine mission.  The platoon commander wishes to maximize the overall benefit 
provided by the helicopter to both squads. 
The platoon commander must rely on the report of a squad that is more interested 
in its own benefit from helicopter usage than the overall benefit provided by the 
helicopter.  Because a squad always benefits from helicopter usage during a mission, a 
selfish squad leader would always request the helicopter when facing any mission, which 
forces the platoon commander to frequently assign the helicopter at random.  Random 
assignment significantly lowers the helicopter’s overall benefit because quite often the 
helicopter is assigned to the squad with a routine mission while the other squad faces a 
critical mission.   
 To improve the overall benefit provided by the helicopter, we design a token 
system to encourage truth-telling from each squad.  The mathematical model is 
formulated as follows: Each squad has a token bank with a finite capacity.  In each time 
period, a squad first finds out its mission type, if it has one, and then decides whether to 
spend 1 or 2 tokens to request the helicopter. A request is granted if the other squad 
spends fewer tokens; in case of a tie, the platoon leader assigns the helicopter at random.  
At the end of each time period, each squad receives a token with some probability set by 
the platoon leader, provided that the number of tokens does not exceed the token bank 
capacity.  Because tokens are limited, a squad needs to decide how to use them wisely.  
In addition, the commander needs to decide the frequency of new token deposits and the 
token bank capacity in order to maximize the overall benefit between the two squads.  
Ideally, the commander wants a policy to force the squads to spend 1 token on a routine 
 xviii
mission and 2 tokens on a critical mission, so that he can always assign the helicopter to 
the squad who needs it the most thus maximizing the helicopter’s overall benefit.  
Because each squad acts as a selfish agent, we model the competition between the two 
squads as a two-person non-zero-sum game.   
 This thesis addresses a theoretical problem that could be adapted to model actual 
military problems.  Although this study is not based on a previously observed problem, it 
has implications for any problem concerning repeated allocation of a resource to multiple 
parties when each party is only concerned with its own utility.  When there are two 
squads, we show that the token bank system is extremely useful when a high probability 
of mission (sum of routine mission probability and critical mission probability) exists.  In 
a typical combat situation, use of the token system allows the commander to achieve over 
90% of the difference between the social optimum and the individual optimum.  When 
there is a high probability of neither critical nor routine missions occurring, the increase 
in expected helicopter benefit provided by the token-bank system is very small.  
 Areas for future research include improving the runtime on our algorithm for 
finding the commander’s optimal token replenishment probability, studying asymmetric 
squads that face different combat scenarios, and expanding the problem to incorporate 





I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis addresses the problem of a platoon commander in charge of two 
squads which encounter two types of missions, critical or routine.  The squads may 
request support in the form of the platoon’s sole helicopter.  The commander does not 
know each squad’s current mission type and must assign the helicopter based on each 
squad’s report.  During a mission, a squad always benefits from having the helicopter, but 
the benefit provided by the helicopter is greater during a critical mission than during a 
routine mission.  The platoon commander wishes to maximize the long-run overall 
benefit provided by the helicopter to both squads. 
The platoon commander must rely on the report of a squad which is more 
interested in its own long-run benefit than the overall benefit provided by the helicopter.  
Because a squad always benefits from helicopter usage during a mission, a selfish squad 
leader would request the helicopter every time the squad faces a mission, which forces 
the platoon commander to frequently assign the helicopter at random.  Random 
assignment significantly lowers the helicopter’s overall benefit because quite often the 
helicopter is assigned to the squad with a routine mission while the other squad faces a 
critical mission.  We study a mechanism implemented by the platoon commander to 
improve the helicopter’s overall benefit. 
 To improve the benefit provided by the helicopter, we design a token system to 
encourage truth-telling from each squad.  The mathematical model is formulated as 
follows: Each squad has a token bank with a finite capacity.  In each time period, a squad 
first finds out its mission type, if it has one, and then decides whether to spend one or two 
tokens to request the helicopter. A request will be granted if the other squad spends fewer 
tokens; in case of a tie, the platoon leader assigns the helicopter at random.  At the end of 
each time period, each squad receives a token with some probability set by the platoon 
leader, provided that the number of tokens does not exceed the token bank capacity.  
Because tokens are limited, a squad needs to decide how to use them wisely.  In addition, 
the commander needs to decide the frequency of new token deposits, and the token bank 
capacity in order to maximize the overall benefit between the two squads.  Ideally, the 
commander wants a policy to force the squads to spend 1 token on a routine mission and 
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2 tokens on a critical mission, so that he can always assign the helicopter to the squad 
who needs it the most thus maximizing the helicopter’s benefit.    
 From a squad’s standpoint, the state can be defined as the number of tokens in its 
bank.  The squad’s policy is the rule that tells the squad whether to request the helicopter 
and how many tokens to spend based on its token bank balance and its mission type.  We 
use a two-person non-zero-sum game to describe the competition between the two squads 
and find its Nash equilibrium.  Finally, we look at the problem from the platoon 
commander’s standpoint, and select the token bank capacity and token replenishment 
probability to maximize the overall benefit provided by the helicopter. 
 This study provides an answer to a theoretical problem that could be adapted to 
model actual military problems.  Although this study is not based on a previously 
observed problem, it has implications for any problem concerning repeated allocation of 
a resource to multiple parties when each party is only concerned with its own utility.  
When there are two squads, we show that the token bank system is extremely useful 
when a high probability of mission (sum of routine mission probability and critical 
mission probability) exists.  When there is a high probability of no mission, the increase 
in expected benefit provided by the token bank system is very small.  
 
1.1 MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
 Consider a platoon leader equipped with a helicopter to support the missions of two 
squads, squad A and squad B, in a discrete-time model.  In each time period, a squad 
faces a critical mission with probability p2, a routine mission with probability p1, or no 
mission with probability p0, where p0 + p1 + p2 = 1.  The mission types between time 
periods are independent, as well as mission types between the two squads.  A squad’s 
reward value for completion of a routine mission with helicopter support is r1, and the 
reward value for completion of a critical mission with helicopter support is r2.  Without 
loss of generality, the reward value for completion of either type of mission without 
helicopter support is 0.  The difficulty of a critical mission and the increase in the 
helicopter’s relative benefit causes r2 to be greater than r1.   
 Each squad keeps a token bank with maximum capacity m.  The commander 
awards each squad a token at the end of each time period with probability µ, and whether 
3 
squad A receives a token is independent of whether squad B receives a token.  At the 
beginning of each time period, a squad can spend 1 or 2 tokens to request the helicopter.  
For a given µ, and m, a squad’s policy is a function that maps from the decision space 
(mission type faced and number of tokens in the bank) to the action space (spend 0, 1, or 
2 tokens).  Because r2 > r1, we let a squad always spend at least 1 token on a critical 
mission unless it does not have a token, and we denote c the minimum number of tokens 
a squad must have to spend 2 tokens on a critical mission.  When facing a routine 
mission, let c1 and c2 denote the minimum number of tokens a squad must have to request 
the helicopter with 1 and 2 tokens respectively. 
 The parameters p0, p1, p2, r1, and r2 are determined by the nature of the combat 
situation.  The goal of each squad is to select c, c1, and c2 to maximize its long-run 
average reward while competing for the same helicopter in a two-person non-zero-sum 
game.  The goal of the platoon leader is to select µ and m so that the overall long-run 
average benefit provided by the helicopter is maximized. 
 
1.2 RELATED RESEARCH 
 Our research problem is similar to the classic prisoner’s dilemma.  If the two 
squads cooperate by always reporting truthfully, each squad’s benefit is maximized.  
However, the individual optimal policy requires each squad to always request the 
helicopter when facing a mission.  The novelty of our research is to design a mechanism 
to encourage truth-telling in a repeated assignment problem.  To the best of our 
knowledge, our work is the first to study the repeated assignment problem in a game-
theoretic framework.   
 Previous work concerning the repeated assignment problem studies a single 
decision maker, who assigns workers to jobs to maximize expected reward.  For example, 
Righter (1989) considers the assignment of activities to resources which arrive according 
to a Poisson process.  Derman (1972) considers the assignment of men to jobs with 
random values.  Other examples include the work by Albright (1972, 1974).  We consider 
a repeated assignment problem over an infinite-time horizon.  The major distinction of 
our problem is that there are two squads competing for the same helicopter, so that each 
squad’s optimal policy depends on the other’s policy.  
4 
 From the game-theoretic standpoint, our work fits in the category of one manager 
(platoon commander) versus multiple selfish agents (squads).  This type of relationship 
has been studied primarily in the context of telecommunications.  Chakravorti (1994) 
considers the problem of a manager of an M/M/1 queue who seeks optimal flow control 
of jobs arriving from selfish users with private information who are also myopic 
optimizers.  Lin (2003) uses a game-theoretic approach to model admission control in a 
single server system with multiple gatekeepers.  He uses an n-person non-zero-sum game 
in which each gatekeeper wishes to maximize its own long-run average reward.  In these 
works, the manager can charge a fee for a service so that the individual optimality 
coincides with the social optimality.  The mechanism we design does not rely on a 
service fee.   
  
1.3 CONTRIBUTION 
 The contribution of this thesis is twofold.  First, we study a repeated assignment 
problem in a game-theoretic framework with multiple selfish agents.  Second, we design 
a mechanism to encourage truth-telling that does not involve charging a fee to the agent.  
This problem proves relevant to any manager who must distribute a limited amount of 
some resource to a greater number of agents with the goal of optimizing that resource’s 
benefit.  Although our problem deals with a two-person game, it can be expanded to an n-
person game.  We believe that our token mechanism will become more effective as the 
number of squads increases relative to the number of helicopters.        
 
1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 In Chapter II, we discuss the interaction between the two squads and find the Nash 
equilibrium of the game.  We do this by finding squad A’s optimal policy assuming 
squad B does not exist.  We then find squad B’s optimal policy based on squad A’s 
optimal policy.  Squad B’s new policy causes squad A to change its policy, and so on.  
This process continues until the game reaches the Nash equilibrium, and neither squad 
has any motivation to further change its policy.    
 In Chapter III, we find the platoon commander’s optimal selection for token bank 
capacity and token replenishment probability.  We develop an algorithm to compute this 
5 
optimal strategy.  As the platoon commander adjusts these constraints, the policies of the 
squads again change.  Therefore, the squads must reach a new Nash equilibrium  
each time the commander adjusts the token bank capacity or the replenishment 
probability.  The goal of the platoon commander is to maximize the overall benefit 
provided by the helicopter. 
 We present our conclusions in Chapter IV, discuss some interesting findings, and 
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II. SQUAD’S STANDPOINT 
This chapter analyzes the helicopter-sharing problem from the standpoint of a 
squad.  The two squads are selfish agents participating in a two-person non-zero-sum 
game in which each squad wishes to maximize its own long-term benefit from helicopter 
usage.  Each squad only controls its own cutoff values for spending tokens to request the 
helicopter; all other parameters are fixed by the commander or the nature of the combat 
situation.  We assume both squads are rational players.  Therefore, each squad chooses 
the policy that maximizes its own long-run average payoff.  Since the policy of squad A 
affects the policy of squad B and vice versa, the choosing of a policy by one squad causes 
the other squad to choose a new policy.  If at some point, each squad’s policy is the best 
response to the other squad’s policy, then no squad has motivation to further change its 
policy.  A pair of such policies is called a Nash equilibrium. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows:  In Section 2.1, we use a Markov 
chain to describe the squad’s behavior.  In Section 2.2, we analyze this Markov chain and 
find its steady-state behavior.  In Section 2.3, we find the Nash equilibrium between the 
two squads.  The techniques used to analyze a Markov chain can be found in many 
textbooks such as Ross (2003).  
 
2.1 A MARKOV CHAIN MODEL 
 Recall that a policy for a squad can be delineated by three parameters c, c1, and c2.  
We define c as the minimum number of tokens a squad must have to spend 2 tokens on a 
critical mission.  When facing a routine mission, let c1 and c2 denote the minimum 
number of tokens a squad must have to request the helicopter with 1 and 2 tokens 
respectively.  We assume that a squad always spends at least 1 token on a critical 
mission. 
Define a squad’s state as the number of tokens in its token bank at the beginning 
of a period.  For a given policy, the evolution of a squad’s state satisfies the Markov 
property, because the future is conditionally independent of the past given the present.  
Hence, we model a squad’s state evolution as a discrete-time Markov chain.  We derive 
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the probabilities that a squad moves from one state to another during one time period 
called the one (time) step transition probabilities.  These probabilities depend on the 
squad’s policy, the mission probabilities, and the token replenishment probability.  We 
use these transition probabilities to build an m+1 x m+1 transition matrix, where m is the 
token bank capacity.  We use the transition probability matrix to find the limiting 
probability for each state, which is the long-run proportion of time the process is in that 
state. 
Denote a squad’s state in period n by Xn, and then {Xn; n = 0,1,…} is a Markov 
chain.  The state space of this Markov chain is {0, 1, …, m}.  Since our process satisfies 
the Markov property, define { }1 |ij n nP P X j X i+= = = .  The Pij values are the one (time) 
step transition probabilities; therefore, they give the probability of the squad transitioning 
from state i to state j during one time period.  Let P denote a square matrix consisting of 
entries P00 to Pmm where m is the maximum token bank capacity.  Row n in the matrix 
contains entries Pn0 ... Pnm.  Each row in P must sum to 1, and each entry must be 
between 0 and 1.   
During one time period a squad can either remain in the same state (its token 
balance does not change), or it can transition to another state.  We determine each 
transition probability from the squad’s policy, the token replenishment probability, and 
the mission probabilities.  The transition diagram in Figure 1 gives a generic example of 
each transition probability for a squad with c = 2, c1 = 4, and c2 = 6.  As stated earlier, we 
assume a squad always spends at least 1 token on a critical mission.  We also assume that 
c1 < c2 and 2c c≤ .    
In state i, there are only four states the Markov chain can move to in the next time 
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Case 2:  1 2c c c= <   
(i) 1i c c< = , same as (i) in case 1. 
(ii) 1i c c= = , same as (iii) in case 1. 
(iii) 2c i c< < , same as (iii) in case 1. 
(iv) 2i c≥ , same as (iv) in case 1. 
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Case 3: 1 2c c c< =  
(i) 1i c< , same as (i) in case 1. 
(ii) 1 2c i c c≤ < = , same as (ii) in case 1. 
(iii) 2i c c= = , same as (iv) in case 1. 
(iv) 2i c> , same as (iv) in case 1. 
 
Case 4:  1 2c c c< <   
(i) i c< , same as (i) in case 1. 
































(iii) 1 2c i c≤ < , same as (iii) in case 1. 






                                             
Figure 1.   Transition diagram for a squad with c = 2, c1 = 4, and c2 = 6. 
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2.2 STEADY-STATE BEHAVIOR OF THE MARKOV CHAIN 
 The Markov chain developed in Section 2.1 is irreducible because all states 
communicate with each other.  In addition, all states in the Markov chain are aperiodic.  
Hence, the Markov chain is regular, which implies that a unique positive limiting 
distribution exists.  For each state j, let πj denote its limiting probability. To find the 
limiting probabilities, we use Matlab to compute Pk for a large value of k until all rows 
converge to the same numbers.  
 Once we know the limiting probabilities, we can determine how often a squad 
spends 1 or 2 tokens to request the helicopter.  For a given policy with c, c1, and c2 










q p pπ π
−−
= =
= +∑ ∑  
In addition, the frequency the squad spends 2 tokens can be calculated as 
( )
2
2 1(2) . 2
m m
k i i
i c i c
q p pπ π
= =
= +∑ ∑  
It follows that  
( )(0) 1 (1) (2). 3k k kq q q= − −  
 
 Recall that each squad’s goal is to maximize its own long-run average payoff.  In 
order to calculate the long-run average payoff, we need to first calculate the probability a 
squad receives the helicopter when requesting it.  Since the commander assigns the 
helicopter to the squad spending the most tokens or randomly breaks a tie, squad A 
receives the helicopter after spending 1 token only if squad B does not spend a token or 
squad B spends 1 token and the helicopter is randomly assigned to squad A.  Therefore, 





qqλ = + , 
where qB(0) and qB(1) are squad B’s probabilities of spending 0 and 1 tokens respectively 
as defined in Equations (3) and (1).  Similarly, the probability of squad A getting the 






qq qλ = + + . 
Finally, we compute the long-run average payoff for squad A by conditioning on 
its state and whether squad A gets the helicopter according to its policy.  Thus, squad A’s 
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Squad B’s payoff is calculated in the same manner.  We can now determine a squad’s 
optimal policy by searching through all feasible policies and finding the maximum payoff 
value.   
 
2.3 THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 The game’s equilibrium is a pair of policies such that neither squad has 
motivation to change its policy.  We start by finding squad A’s optimal policy assuming 




1 1 2 2
1
c m c m
i i i i
i c i c i i c
r p r pπ π π π
− −
= = = =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
We then find squad B’s optimal policy assuming that squad B has perfect knowledge of 
squad A’s policy.  Squad B’s new policy causes squad A to change its policy, and so on.  
Usually both squads have the same optimal policy because the model is symmetric 
between two squads.  We write a program in Matlab and usually can find the Nash 
equilibrium in seconds.  
 
Table 1.   Baseline example parameters. 
p0 p1 p2 µ r1 r2 m 
0.30 0.50 0.20 0.90 1 8 20 
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We use the baseline example parameters from Table 1 to illustrate how our 
algorithm works to find the Nash equilibrium.  Squad A’s optimal policy assuming squad 
B does not exist is c1 = 3 (squad A never spends 2 tokens to request the helicopter since 
we assume squad B does not exist) which yields a payoff of 2.1000.  Squad B’s optimal 
response is c = 2, c1 = 7, and c2 = 17, and squad B’s payoff is 1.7347.  Squad A responds 
to squad B by choosing a policy of c = 2, c1 = 7, and c2 = 18, and squad A’s payoff 
becomes 1.6852.  Squad B responds with an identical policy of c = 2, c1 = 7, and c2 = 18 
and has a payoff of 1.6879.  Squad A does not change its policy, and it receives the same 
average payoff as squad B.  Squad B then chooses to remain at the same policy, and the 
game has reached its Nash equilibrium with the helicopter providing an overall benefit of 
3.3759.     
Using the same baseline example from Table 1, we demonstrate the effects of 
varying some parameters on a squad’s optimal policy.  In most cases squad A and squad 
B have identical policies.  However, in some cases the policies are slightly different.  
Figure 2 shows the change in the c, c1, and c2 cutoff values as m increases from 2 to 20.  
In Figure 3, we fix m = 20 and increment µ on [0.50, 1] by steps of 0.05.  Table 2 shows 
the effect of varying r2 on the squad’s policies.  In Figure 4, we vary p1 while holding p2 
constant, and we do the opposite in Figure 5.     
 
 
Figure 2.   Optimal policy for each squad when varying m using the baseline 
example in Table 1.   
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Figure 2 shows that the squads are not willing to spend 2 tokens on a routine 
mission until m ≥ 6, but they are always willing to spend 2 tokens on a critical mission.  
The routine cutoff values increase as m increases.  The two squads have different policies 
when m = 3, otherwise the policies are identical.  Usually the squads have identical 
policies since they are symmetric, but occasionally in the game’s Nash equilibrium a 
squad’s optimal response to the other squad’s policy is a slightly different policy.  The 
discrete nature of m and the cutoff values causes the squads’ optimal policies to differ 





Figure 3.   Optimal policy for each squad when varying µ using the baseline 




 As seen in Figure 3, the squads do not spend 2 tokens to request the helicopter 





Table 2.   Effect of critical reward on squad policy using the baseline example in 
Table 1. 
    Helicopter
r2 c c1 c2 Benefit 
2 3 5 18 1.2464 
4 2 6 18 1.9566 
8 2 7 18 3.3759 
16 2 7 18 6.2190 
32 2 8 18 11.8917 
 
As seen in Table 2, an increase in the reward for helicopter usage during a critical 
mission makes the squads more willing to spend 2 tokens on a critical mission and less 
likely to request the helicopter for a routine mission.   
 
 
Figure 4.   Optimal policy for each squad when varying p1 using the baseline 
example from Table 1.  
 
As seen in Figure 4, the increase in p1 causes c1 and c2 to increase.  For            
0.65 < p1 < 0.80, the squads never spend 2 tokens on a routine mission.  The squads 




Figure 5.   Optimal policy for each squad when varying p2 using the baseline 
example from Table 1.   
 
As shown in Figure 5, an increase in p2 causes c, c1, and c2 to exhibit upward 
trends.  The routine cutoff values increase such that the squads never spend 2 tokens on a 
routine mission when p2 > 0.25, and they only spend 1 token on a routine mission with a 
full token bank when p2 > 0.40.  Once 2 0.25, 2.p c≥ >  
As stated previously, the two policies in Nash equilibrium can be slightly 
different.  For example, when p0 = 0.30, p1 = 0.50, p2 = 0.20, µ = 0.90, m = 3, r1 = 1, and 
r2 = 8 (as shown in Figure 2), these two policies form a Nash equilibrium: (A)  c = 2, and 
c1 = 3 and (B)  c = 2, and c1 = 1.  The squads do not spend 2 tokens on a routine mission 
in this example.   
 In a very rare occurrence, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium for the game.  
Such an occurrence typically involves three policies α, β, and γ, such that β is the best 
response to α, γ is the best response to β, while α is the best response to γ.  For example, 
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III. COMMANDER’S STANDPOINT 
 This chapter analyzes the helicopter-sharing problem from the standpoint of the 
platoon commander.  The commander wishes to maximize the overall average long-term 
benefit (sum of each squad’s payoff) provided by the helicopter.  Recall that once the 
commander decides on m, the token-bank capacity, and µ, the replenishment probability, 
the two squads become players in the two-person non-zero-sum game described in 
Chapter II.  The goal of the commander is to choose m and µ such that the total benefit 
resulting from the Nash equilibrium in this two-person game is maximized. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:  In Section 3.1, we fix m and find 
the value of µ that maximizes the helicopter’s benefit.  In Section 3.2, we allow m to vary 
and discuss its effect on the helicopter’s benefit.  In Section 3.3, we present the game’s 
individual optimum and social optimum, which are determined by the nature of the 
combat situation.  We provide sensitivity analysis by changing the parameters of the 
combat situation and observing the effect on the commander’s optimal policy.  
  
3.1 TOKEN REPLENISHMENT PROBABILITY  
 In this section we fix m and discuss the effect of varying µ.  The mission 
probabilities have the greatest effect on finding µ*, the optimal µ that maximizes the total 
helicopter benefit.  Ideally, the commander would like each squad to spend 2 tokens on a 
critical mission and 1 token on a routine mission so that the commander can always make 
the correct helicopter assignment.  If a squad always requested truthfully, then the 
expected number of tokens that squad spends each time period is 1 22p p+  tokens.  Since 
m is finite, the squad may have incentive to spend 2 tokens on a routine mission when its 
token bank is nearly full and to spend 1 token on a critical mission when its token bank 
has few tokens (in order to save tokens for possible future missions).  As a consequence, 
the commander cannot force the squads to report truthfully no matter what values of m 
and µ he chooses. 
 For a given m, we can evaluate the objective function—the total benefit provided 
by the helicopter between two squads—for µ in [0,1] to find µ*.  Because we assume the 
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objective function is unimodal in µ, we use an algorithm employing the Golden Section 
search to find µ* more efficiently.  Since µ must be in [0,1], we know that our algorithm 
provides an interval of width 0.0031 in which µ* can be found after 12 iterations.  The 
algorithm goes as follows on the interval [a1, b1] for k = 1: 
1.  Set 5 1
2
α −=    
2.  Set ( )( )1 1k k k ka b aϕ µ α= = + − −  
3.  Set ( )2k k k ka b aρ µ α= = + −  
4.  Each squad determines its optimal policy for µ1 and µ2, and the commander compares 
the average helicopter benefit yielded by each µ.  ( ) ( )( ),k kf fϕ ρ  
5.  Update 
Case 1: ( ) ( )k kf fϕ ρ≥  
 i.  Set 1 1 1; ;k k k k k ka a bρ ϕ ρ+ + += = =  
 ii.  Set ( ) ( )1k kf fρ ϕ+ =  
 iii.  Compute ( )( )1 1 1 11k k k ka b aϕ α+ + + += + − − and ( )1kf ϕ +  
 
Case 2: ( ) ( )k kf fϕ ρ<  
 i.  Set 1 1 1; ;k k k k k ka b bϕ ϕ ρ+ + += = =  
 ii.  Set ( ) ( )1k kf fϕ ρ+ =  
 iii.  Compute ( )1 1 1 1k k k ka b aρ α+ + + += + −  and ( )1kf ρ +    
   
6.  If 1 1k kb a ε+ +− <  end search, µ* is in [ ]1 1,k ka b+ + .  Otherwise set 1k k= + , and go to 
Update. 
 
Using the parameters given in Table 1, we investigate the effect of varying µ on 
the helicopter’s overall benefit.  For this combat situation, we find µ* = 0.8773, and the 
average overall helicopter benefit is 3.3863.  Figure 6 shows the helicopter’s benefit 
improves as we increase µ until *µ µ= , then the overall benefit decreases. 
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Figure 6.   Effect of varying µ on helicopter benefit when using parameters from 
baseline example in Table 1. 
 
 
 Using the parameters from Table 1, we increment m on [2, 20] and are able to find 
µ* using our Golden Section search algorithm for each m.  Figure 7 shows µ* exhibiting 
a downward trend (it does not necessarily decrease monotonically) as it approaches a 
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Figure 7.   Optimal replenishment probabilities (µ*) for 2 20m≤ ≤  when using 





3.2 TOKEN BANK CAPACITY 
In this section we discuss how the total helicopter benefit changes as m changes.  
The overall long-term average benefit provided by the helicopter follows an upward trend 
as the commander raises m.  However, it is not necessarily monotonically increasing.  
Eventually, as m continues to increase, the relative increase in helicopter benefit begins to 
decline.  Since m must be finite, and it is unreasonable for it to be very large, the 
commander must develop a cutoff value for m based on the increase in the helicopter’s 
benefit relative to m – 1.  
Consider the baseline example from Table 1.  Figure 8 shows overall helicopter 
benefit for each m on [0, 20] when the commander uses µ* for the given m.  As stated 
earlier, helicopter benefit follows an upward trend as m increases.     
  Occasionally an increase in m causes a decrease in the overall helicopter benefit.  
This occasional decrease is attributed to the discrete nature of the cutoff values and that 
each squad has only a finite number of feasible policies.  Table 3 shows the overall 
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helicopter benefit and each squad’s policy when p0 = 0.30, p1 = 0.50, p2 = 0.20, r1 = 1, 
and r2 = 8 for different m values.  Both squads have the same policy in each example.  
Note that the commander can achieve a higher helicopter benefit by assigning  m = 5 than 
assigning m = 6. 
 
Table 3.   Decrease in helicopter benefit as m increases. 
m µ* c c1 c2 
Helicopter 
Benefit 
5 0.9187 2 4 6 3.3192 
6 0.8572 2 4 7 3.3004 
7 0.8154 3 5 8 3.3042 
8 0.7945 3 6 9 3.3049 
9 0.8936 2 5 9 3.3128 
10 0.8792 2 5 10 3.3311 
 
 
3.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we expand on the baseline example given in Table 1 by varying the 
combat parameters (mission probabilities and the critical mission reward value) and 
compare these results to the game’s individual optimum and social optimum.  If the 
commander does not employ some mechanism to encourage truth-telling, selfish squad 
leaders always request the helicopter when facing a mission.  Therefore, the commander 
has no means of knowing the mission type of either squad.  This lack of policy forces the 
commander to randomly assign the helicopter whenever both squads request it, which 
results in the game’s individual optimum.    This individual optimum can be calculated as 
the sum of each squad’s long-run average payoff when the squads always request the 
helicopter for a mission:   
( )1 2 1 1 2 22 1 .2
p p p r p r⎡ + ⎤⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
 
To find the game’s social optimum, we assume the squads are always truthful in 




commander assigns the helicopter to the squad that needs it most, or he randomly assigns 
the helicopter if both squads face the same mission type.  The social optimum can be 
calculated as  
 
1 2
1 0 1 2 0 1 22 .2 2
p pp p r p p p r⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
 
We next compare the performance of our token bank policy with the individual 
and social optimum.  We show that the token system greatly improves the helicopter’s 
overall average benefit compared to the individual optimum during typical combat 
situations.  As we increase the mission probabilities and the critical reward value, we 
show that the token system’s benefit over the individual optimum increases.  The 
usefulness of the token bank depends on the overall combat situation.  If a very low 
probability of mission is coupled with a low critical reward value, the benefit provided by 
a token bank system may be trivial. 
 Using the baseline example given in Table 1, we calculate the individual optimum 
and social optimum as 2.73 and 3.43 respectively.  Figure 8 shows the helicopter’s 
overall benefit at µ* for each m and the individual optimum and social optimum as 
dictated by the combat situation.  The token system always provides greater benefit than 
the individual optimum for these combat parameters.  We can also compare the relative 
increase in the helicopter’s overall benefit when the token system is employed.  Figure 9 
shows the increase in average helicopter benefit relative to the individual optimum and 
the increase in helicopter benefit on the interval between the individual optimum and the 
social optimum.  When m = 20, the token system improves on the individual optimum by 
almost 25%, and it increases the helicopter’s benefit over 90% of the feasible interval of 
improvement (region between individual optimum and social optimum).  As we increase 
the mission probabilities and the critical reward value, we show in our sensitivity analysis 
that the token system provides even greater benefit relative to the individual optimum.  In 
our sensitivity analysis we also study the effect of varying r2, p1, and p2 on µ* and the 
optimal m (m*).   
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Figure 8.   Change in helicopter benefit as m increases when using µ* for each m, 
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Figure 9.   Increase in helicopter benefit when using token system relative to the 
individual optimum and on the interval between the individual 
optimum and the social optimum. 
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3.3.1 Adjusting Routine Mission Probability 
Let p2 = 0.20, r1 = 1, r2 = 8, and 2 20m≤ ≤ .  We adjust p1, study the effect on µ* 
and m*, and compare the results with the individual optimum and the social optimum.  In 
Table 4, we show the results of this sensitivity analysis on p1.  The commander does not 
always choose m = 20 as seen when p1 = 0.20.  For p1 = 0.80, m = 18, 19, or 20 all yield 
an equal average overall helicopter benefit.  The commander would choose a larger m if 
allowed to do so because as shown earlier, helicopter benefit follows an upward trend as 
m increases.  The optimal token replenishment probability, µ*, is near 1 22p p+  when 
1 22 1p p+ < , and it approaches 1 as p1 + 2p2 becomes greater than 1.  For p1 = 0.80, the   
helicopter’s benefit when using the token system is 45% greater than the individual 
optimum, and the token system increases the helicopter’s benefit 96.38% on the feasible 
region of improvement (between the individual optimum and the social optimum). 
 
Table 4.   Sensitivity analysis on p1. 






















0.20 19 0.6200 2.88 3.16 3.0965 7.52% 77.32% 
0.30 20 0.7020 2.85 3.27 3.2034 12.40% 84.14% 
0.40 20 0.7891 2.80 3.36 3.3032 17.97% 89.86% 
0.50 20 0.8773 2.73 3.43 3.3863 24.04% 93.76% 
0.60 20 0.9718 2.64 3.48 3.4535 30.81% 96.85% 
0.70 20 0.9988 2.53 3.51 3.4794 37.53% 96.88% 
0.80 18-20 0.9988 2.40 3.52 3.4795 44.98% 96.38% 
 
 
3.3.2 Adjusting Critical Mission Probability  
Let p1 = 0.50, r1 = 1, r2 = 8, and 2 20m≤ ≤ .  We now adjust p2, study the effect 
on µ* and m*, and compare the results with the individual optimum and the social 
optimum.  We show our results in Table 5.  The commander always chooses m = 20 in 
these scenarios.  For p2 = 0.10, µ* is near 0.70.  As p2 increases, µ* is near 1 22p p+  until 
1 22 1p p+ >  and µ* remains near 1.  When comparing the token system’s benefit to the 
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individual optimum, the increase in relative benefit is strictly increasing as p2 increases 
(approximately 33% when p2 = 0.50). The token system’s increased benefit on the 
feasible region reaches approximately 95% when p2 = 0.30 then decreases slightly as p2 
continues to increase.   
 
Table 5.   Sensitivity analysis on p2. 






















0.10 20 0.7001 1.82 2.17 2.1340 17.25% 89.71% 
0.20 20 0.8773 2.73 3.43 3.3863 24.04% 93.76% 
0.30 20 0.9988 3.48 4.53 4.4761 28.62% 94.87% 
0.40 20 0.9988 4.07 5.47 5.3147 30.58% 88.91% 
0.50 20 0.9888 4.50 6.25 6.0071 33.49% 86.12% 
 
 
3.3.3 Adjusting Reward Values 
Let p1 = 0.50, p2 = 0.20, r1 = 1, and 2 20m≤ ≤ .  As stated earlier, 2 1r r> .  We 
increase r2 exponentially, study the effect on µ* and m*, and compare the results with the 
individual optimum and the social optimum.  We show our results in Table 6.  The 
commander always chooses m = 20 for these scenarios.  His choice of µ* when r2 = 2 is 
approximately 1 22p p+  and decreases as r2 increases.  In this example, the helicopter’s 
benefit relative to the individual optimum, and the increased benefit on the region 
between the individual optimum and the social optimum are strictly increasing as r2 
increases.     
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Table 6.   Sensitivity analysis on r2. 






















2 20 0.9106 1.17 1.27 1.2475 6.62% 77.50% 
4 20 0.8804 1.69 1.99 1.9581 15.86% 89.37% 
8 20 0.8773 2.73 3.43 3.3863 24.04% 93.76% 
16 20 0.8534 4.81 6.31 6.2472 29.88% 95.81% 
32 20 0.8328 8.97 12.07 11.9895 33.66% 97.40% 
 
 
We show in Section 3.2 that increasing m causes the average helicopter benefit to 
exhibit an upward trend.  However, in Section 3.3 we only examine m such that  
2 20m≤ ≤ .  This is because of the computing time required to run these scenarios with  
very large token bank capacities.  When 2 20m≤ ≤ , it takes several hours to find the 
corresponding µ* values.  We further discuss this in Chapter IV when we suggest ideas 







 In this thesis we study the repeated assignment problem in a game-theoretic 
framework.  The two squads are selfish agents in a two-person non-zero-sum game.  As 
in the prisoner’s dilemma, the socially optimal strategy yields a higher payoff for each 
player than the individually optimal strategy.  We implement a token system to encourage 
the squads to truthfully report their mission type to the commander.  We use discrete-time 
Markov chains to model a squad’s state evolution.  Other works which study a manager 
(platoon commander) versus multiple selfish agents (squads) from a game-theoretic 
framework require the manager to charge a service fee to encourage social optimality.  
We design a mechanism which does not rely on a service fee.  The basis of our problem 
is theoretical, but its results can prove relevant for a manager repeatedly assigning a 
limited resource to multiple selfish agents.   
 
4.1 FINDINGS 
 We develop an algorithm to find the commander’s optimal token replenishment 
probability based on the combat situation and the size of the token bank.  The commander 
cannot force the squads to always request truthfully.  The desire of each squad to 
maximize its own payoff causes the Nash equilibrium of the game to always yield a 
lower average overall helicopter benefit than if the squads were truthful.  For increasing 
m, the average helicopter benefit follows an upward trend.  Numerical examples show 
that for typical combat scenarios, the benefit provided by the token bank system can be 
significant.  
 
4.2 IMPROVEMENTS          
 We were unable to study the effects of a very large token bank capacity because 
of the required computing time to do so.  Currently, the runtime on our algorithm for 
finding the optimal token replenishment probability increases exponentially as m 
increases.  It takes several hours to find µ* for 2 20m≤ ≤ .  An improvement in the 
runtime of this algorithm would allow a more thorough examination of the effects of 
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raising m.  We also assume that the helicopter’s overall benefit is unimodal over all µ for 
any given set of parameters.  We came to this conclusion after working out numerous 
cases, but we did not prove this rigorously.    
 
4.3 EXTENSIONS 
 Several possible extensions to our work exist.  The model could be modified for 
asymmetric squads such that each squad could have different mission probabilities and 
mission reward values.  The problem could be expanded to an n-person non-zero-sum 
game.  Other token systems are also possible.  For instance, the commander could allow a 
squad to spend as many tokens as it wishes to request the helicopter.  The commander 
could also deposit a new token with different probabilities depending on a squad’s token 
balance. We expect these extensions to further shed light on repeated assignment 






LIST OF REFERENCES 
Albright, S.C. 1974. Optimal sequential assignments with random arrival times. 
Management Science 21, 60-67. 
Albright, S.C. and Derman, C. 1972.  Asymptotic optimal policies for the stochastic 
sequential assignment problem. Management Science 19, 46-51. 
Chakravorti, B. 1994. Optimal flow control of an M/M/1 queue with a balanced budget. 
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 39, 1918-1921. 
 
Derman, C., Lieberman, G.J. and Ross, S.M. 1972. A sequential stochastic assignment 
problem.  Management Science 18, 349-355. 
 
Lin, K.Y. 2003. Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game-theoretic 
model. Naval Research Logistics 50, 702-718. 
 
Righter, R. 1989. A resource allocation problem in a random environment. Operations 
Research 37, 329-338. 
 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
33 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Kyle Y. Lin 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. Steven E. Pilnick 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
5. Clifton G. Lennon 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
6. Jason M. McGowan 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
